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The Behavioral Assumptions Underlying
NLRB Regulation of Campaign Misrepre-
sentations: An Empirical Evaluation*
Part II
Julius G. Getmant
Stephen B. Goldberg-
The National Labor Relations Board, under its Hollywood Ceramics1
doctrine, will set aside any representation election in which the winning
party intentionally or unintentionally makes an assertion of fact or law
that "involves a substantial departure from the truth, at a time which
prevents the other party or parties from making an effective reply... [and
which] may reasonably be expected to have a significant impact on the
election."2 Despite scholarly criticism,' and expressions of misgivings by
Board members themselves,' the Board has applied the Hollywood Ceram-
ics doctrine frequently to set aside elections in which employers or unions
have made inaccurate or misleading statements.
For example, in one case the Board set aside an election where an em-
ployer claimed that the union on other occasions had bargained away
existing benefits. Because the employer failed to mention that the union
had negotiated new benefits in their stead, these statements were found
* This is the second of two articles based on the authors' empirical study of voting behavior in
NLRB elections funded by grants from the National Science Foundation and the Russell Sage Founda-
tion. The first article, NLRB Regulation of Campaign Tactics: The Behavioral Assumptions on
Which the Board Regulates, 27 STAx. L. REv. X465 (1975), primarily develops the assumptions about
employees' susceptibility to campaigning which underlie the Board's rules governing representation
election campaigns. The authors' complete findings are soon to be published in book form by the
Russell Sage Foundation. This study was conducted in collaboration with Professor Jeanne B. Herman
of the University of Michigan, who assisted in the collection and analysis of the data.
t B.A. 1951, C.C.N.Y.; LL.B. 1958, LL.M. 1963, Harvard University. Professor of Law, Indiana
University. Visiting Professor of Law, Stanford University.
I B.A. 1954, LL.B. 1959, Harvard University. Professor of Law, Northwestern University. Affil-
iated Scholar, American Bar Foundation.
1. 14o N.L.R.B. 221 (1962).
2. Id. at 224.
3. See Bok, The Regulation of Campaign Tactics in Representation Elections Under the National
Labor Relations Act, 78 HARv. L. REV. 38, 82-92 (1964); Samoff, NLRB Elections: Uncertainty and
Certainty, 117 U. PA. L. REv. 228,2.34 (1968).
4. In his dissent in Medical Ancillary Services, Inc., 212 N.L.R.B. No. So (July 29, 1974), Board
member Penello suggested that Hollywood Ceramics "should be reversed and the Board should
revert to its policy of setting elections aside only upon a showing of intentional deception rising to
the level of fraud." Id. at 9. See also Modine Mfg. Co., 203 N.L.R.B. 527, 528-30 (1973). Former
Chairman Miller expressed concern about the doctrine in Southern Health Corp. d/b/a Corydon
Nursing Home, 2o1 N.L.R.B. 462, 462-63 (1973).
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to create a false impression preventing the exercise of free choice.' In
another case, the employer distributed a weekly paycheck reduced by the
amount of union dues, which was paid separately. This tactic was thought
to give the erroneous impression that union dues would be deducted weekly
instead of monthly.6 By far the greatest number of cases in which elections
have been set aside under Hollywood Ceramics have involved inaccurate
or misleading union statements concerning wages or benefits obtained
elsewhere.7 While the Board has held unions to a high standard of accuracy,
the courts have been even more rigorous where union statements are con-
cerned. The Fifth Circuit's statement that "assertions concerning wages
. .. are... the selfsame subjects concerning which men organize and
elect their representatives to bargain"' has been widely cited with ap-
proval
The Hollywood Ceramics doctrine, in common with other Board rules
governing campaign tactics,1" is based on the Board's desire to protect
employee freedom of choice. As the Board explained in Hollywood Ce-
ramics, "where employees cast their ballots upon the basis of a material
misrepresentation, such vote cannot reflect their uninhibited desires, and
they have not exercised the kind of choice envisaged by the Act."11 Implicit
in the Board's rules governing misrepresentations, as well as in other rules
intended to protect employees' free choice, are two assumptions about em-
ployees' behavior in representation elections: (i) employees attend closely
to the preelection campaign; (2) employees' voting predispositions prior
to the campaign are tenuous and easily changed by information acquired
during the campaign. 2
5. Bausch & Lomb, Inc., 185 N.L.R.B. 262 (1970).
6. National Mobile Homes, i86 N.L.R.B. 891 (1970). See also Malloy Capacitor Co., 16I
N.L.R.B. 1510 (1966), in which reproducing a portion of an NLRB complaint in such a way as to
give the impression that the employer had authoritatively been found to have committed the acts
charged was held to violate Hollywood Ceramics.
7. See, e.g., Zarn, Inc., 17o N.L.R.B. 1135 (1968); Ore-Ida Foods, Inc., I6o N.L.R.B. 1396
(x966).
8. NLRB v. Houston Chronicle Publishing Co., 300 F.2d 273, 28o (1962).
9. See, e.g., NLRB v. Producers Cooperative Ass'n, 457 F.2d 1121, 1125 (ioth Cir. 1972). Cf.
Cross Baking Co. v. NLRB, 453 F.2d 1346 (ist Cir. 1971). It has been suggested that the courts are
trying to ensure that the Board treats unions as strictly as it treats employers in regulating campaign
speech. See R. WILLIuAs, P. JANus & K. Hu-nN, NLRB REGULATION OF ELECTION CoNDuar 24-25
0974).
IO. The Board's rules governing campaign tactics are established by Board case law. See Get-
man, Goldberg & Herman, NLRB Regulation of Campaign Tactics: The Behavioral Assumptions on
Which the Board Regulates, 27 STAN. L. Rav. 1465, 1465 n.4 (1975) [hereinafter referred to as
Part I]. These rules regulate many aspects of union and employer speech and activity during the
period preceding a NLRB representation election. See generally Part I, supra. The model of "lab-
oratory conditions" which the Board attempts to achieve in representation elections stands in sharp
contrast to the lack of regulation in political campaigns. See id. at 1469-70, 1488-90.
MI. 14o N.L.R.B. at 223.
x2. The assumption that voting intention is tenuous is obviously related to and partially founded
upon the assumption that employees are unsophisticated about labor relations. See, e.g., Bausch &
Lomb, Inc., 185 N.L.R.B. 262 (1970), discussed in text at note 5 supra.
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We recently tested these and other Board assumptions 8 in an empirical
study designed to determine the effect of union and employer campaigning
on employees' predispositions to vote for or against union representation.
As the findings that follow demonstrate, our data about employees' voting
behavior are inconsistent with the assumptions underlying the Hollywood
Ceramics doctrine.1'
I. METHODOLOGY
To develop our research design, we studied six elections during a pre-
test stage between July 1968 and January I972.' In the actual study, we
then interviewed over iooo employees eligible to vote in an additional 31
NLRB elections held between February 1972 and September 1973.
A. Selecting Elections for Study
Since we wanted to test the effect of the campaign on voting behavior,
the primary consideration in selecting elections to study was the likelihood
of vigorous campaigning. In order to maximize the generalizability of
our findings, we also sought to include a variety of businesses, unions, unit
sizes, and communities.
We were quite successful in identifying elections in which there was
vigorous campaigning by both parties. In 28 of the 3 elections studied, at
least one party engaged in substantial campaigning by distributing written
materials, holding meetings and personally contacting employees. In 2o
elections, both parties campaigned vigorously. Unlawful campaigning oc-
curred in 22 elections2O
13. Other assumptions underlying Board rules indude the following: (i) that employees will
interpret ambiguous statements by the employer as threats or promises; (2) that employees are un-
sophisticated about labor relations; (3) that employees are easily swayed by their employer's eco-
nomic power over them, and in particular, that threats of reprisal and promises of benefits are likely
to coerce employees; and (4) that limited union campaigning on company premises is adequate to
reach employees. These and other assumptions are discussed in detail in Part I, supra note so, at
1470--82.
14. The authors' study examined other Board rules and assumptions governing representation
campaigns than those involved in Hollywood Ceramics. See note 13 supra; note 58 infra. The full
report of this study will soon be forthcoming. See note * supra. Stanford Law Review will publish
a series of commentaries on this full report in Volume 28.
15. The pretest results and research design are set out in detail in Getman, Goldberg & Herman,
The National Labor Relations Board Voting Study: A Preliminary Report, i J. LEG. Stmu. 233 (1972).
16. The following procedure was used in determining whether or not unlawful campaigning
took place. If unfair labor practice charges or objections to the election were filed and ruled upon,
the official disposition of those charges was treated as determinative of the legality of the conduct in-
volved. At times, however, charges or objections were not filed even though conduct had occurred
that was arguably or even dearly unlawful. The losing party was sometimes unaware of the con-
duct in question or its unlawfulness, or, if the election was lost by a wide margin, uninterested in
the possibility of obtaining a rerun election or even a bargaining order. Additionally, no winning
party ever protested the loser's election practices, presumably since the only remedy in such a case
would be a cease and desist order of little practical value.
When charges were not filed, we made a preliminary determination, based upon the campaign
materials and what the parties told us, as to whether conduct had occurred that was arguably un-
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The 3 elections involved firms representing a broad range of business
operations. Employers in i8 elections were involved in some type of manu-
facturing operation. The other businesses studied included three automo-
bile dealerships, two retail stores, two health care facilities, one motel, one
multiple-line insurance company, one manufacturer and distributor of food
products, and one trucking company.
We studied elections in Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Missouri, and Kentucky.
They were located in communities ranging in size from Chicago and St.
Louis to Chatsworth, Illinois (pop. 1,255), and Morgantown, Kentucky
(pop. 1,394). The number of voters in the units studied ranged from four
to just under 4oo.
B. Structuring Employee Interviews
If the unit size was under 25, all employees were interviewed. In units
of more than 25, we interviewed a randomly selected one-third sample,
with a minimum sample size of 25 and a maximum of ioo. All employees
in the sample were interviewed twice." The wave I interview took place as
soon as possible after the election date was set." The wave II interview
occurred immediately after the election."
The vast majority of the employees contacted were willing to be inter-
viewed. The average refusal rate at wave I was 6 percent; at wave II it was
5 percent. The overall noncompletion rate, which includes employees who
could not be contacted as well as those who refused to be interviewed, was
14 percent at wave I, 7 percent at wave II. The few employees who could
not be contacted or refused to be interviewed did not bias the sample. The
proportion of pro-union voters in the total across-election sample was pre-
cisely the same (45 percent) as the proportion of pro-union voters in the
total across-election population.
lawful. All arguably unlawful speech and conduct not passed upon by the Board was submitted to
Melvin J. Welles, Administrative Law Judge, NLRB, who had agreed to decide, on an unofficial basis,
whether material was either unlawful or grounds on whch valid objections might be based. Conduct
taking place during the campaign was coded as illegal or objectionable only on the basis of a decision
by the Board or an administrative law judge in official Board proceedings, or on a finding by Judge
Weles.
17. This research design (interviewing the same subjects several times over a given period)
is typically used to study voting behavior in political elections. See, e.g., B. BERatsox, P. LAzAnsFELD
& V. McPHEs, VOTING: A STuY OF' OPINION FORMATION IN A PRESbDENTIAL CAMPAIGN (1954); A.
CAMPBELL, P. CONvERsE, W. MILLER & D. SToxEs, Tim AmEascAc VoTR (i96o); P. LAzARnsFsL,
B. BERELsoN & H. GAunET, Tim PEoLE 's CHOica (3rd ed. i968).
i8. The initial research design contemplated interviewing the voters three times before the
election rather than once. This approach was dropped after the first pretest, see note 15 supra, pri-
marily because the campaigns were compressed into such a brief period that repeated questioning as to
campaign content elicited too little additional information to warrant the cost of frequent interviews.
For this reason, we decided to ask about campaign content only during the wave II interviews.
See note i9 in/ra and accompanying text.
ig. See note 17 supra. For more exact data on the interval between the election and the wave
II interview, see note 47 infra.
2o. The sample results differed significantly from the election results in only two individual
[VOL. 28: Page 263
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In the wave I interview employees were asked a series of questions de-
signed to determine their attitudes toward working conditions and unions
in general. On the basis of their responses, we constructed separate job
satisfaction 2 and union attitude'5 indexes for each employee. Employees
were also asked whether or not they had signed a union authorization card
and how they planned to vote.
In the wave II interview, employees were asked how they had voted
and why. They were also asked to report as much as they could remember
about the content of the campaign. Closed-end screening questions were
used to determine if the employee had been exposed to a particular type of
campaigning (for example, "Did you, at any time before the election, get
any letters or other written material from the Company discussing the
Union or the election?"). Those employees who answered "yes" were then
asked for their recollection of the campaign message ("What did they
say?").
C. Measuring Employees' Recall of Campaign Issues
In order to determine the actual content of the employer and union
campaigns, we interviewed the organizer in charge of the union's campaign
and the person in charge of the employer's campaign, normally the per-
sonnel manager or labor relations attorney. We asked for copies of all
written materials used in the campaign, transcripts of all speeches and a
report of what was said in the speeches and meetings for which transcripts
were not available. Additionally, each party was questioned about the issues
raised in personal efforts to persuade employees to vote for or against the
union.
During the pretest studies we developed content categories for coding
elections. In one of those elections there was a 6-month delay between wave I and the election due
to an appeal from the Regional Director's direction of election. Substantial turnover during that
period reduced the sample size from 44 employees to 31 employees.
21. Responses to the following eight questions were used to compute the job satisfaction index:
(i) Are you satisfied or not satisfied with your wages? (2) Do supervisors in this company play
favorites or do they treat all employees alike? (3) Are you satisfied or not satisfied with the type
of work you are doing? (4) Do your supervisors show appreciation when you do a good job or
do they just take it for granted? (5) Are you satisfied or not satisfied with your fringe benefits, such
as pensions, vacations, holiday pay, insurance, and sick leave? (6) Do you think there is a good
chance or not much chance for you to get promotion in this company? (7) Are you satisfied or not
satisfied with the job security at this company? (8) Taking everything into consideration, would you
say that you are satisfied or not satisfied with this company as a place to work?
22. Responses to the following eight questions were used to compute the union attitude index:
(X) Unions are becoming too strong. Do you agree or disagree? (2) Unions make sure that em-
ployees are treated fairly by supervisors. Do you agree or disagree? (3) Unions help working men
and women to get better wages and hours. Do you agree or disagree? (4) Unions interfere with
good relations between companies and workers. Do you agree or disagree? (5) Union dues are too
high. Do you agree or disagree? (6) When a strike is called, it is generally for a good reason. Do you
agree or disagree? (7) Unions are a major cause of high prices. Do you agree or disagree? (8) Taking
everything into consideration, would you describe your overall attitude toward unions as favorable
or not favorable?
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campaign issues. This code allowed us to classify the issues raised in each
election so that we could compare employees' familiarity with similar
issues across elections.
After the campaign materials were read and coded, a profile of each
party's campaign was constructed. The person who coded the campaign
would then read and code the responses of the employees interviewed in
that election. Employee responses were compared to the profile to determine
how familiar each employee was with the issues raised in that campaign. An
employee's union familiarity index (UFI) recorded the proportion of issues
in the union campaign profile that he mentioned in his wave II interview.
The company familiarity index (CFI) was similarly constructed.
It is possible that the coders' knowledge of the actual campaign issues
before reading the employees' responses built in a bias favoring the coding
of an employee's response as recognition of a campaign issue. We chose
to run that risk, however, rather than possibly understate campaign famili-
arity. We also sought to avoid understating campaign familiarity by making
it unnecessary for an employee to report any details of a campaign issue in
order to be credited with having recalled that issue. For example, one em-
ployee answered questions asked about the content of a union letter as
follows:
Said they'd make it better (x) pay (x) stop bosses playing favorites (x) retire-
ment plan (x) don't know, just get us one (x) that all.23
This answer was coded as recalling the union's claims that it would improve
wages, obtain a retirement plan and prevent supervisors from treating
employees unfairly. While the employee furnished no details about the
union's claims, he did remember the issues that had been raised.
It was conceivable that the wave I interviews, which occurred prior to
the campaign, might sensitize employees to the issues of the campaign or
influence their voting behavior. While costs prohibited using control groups
in every election, they were used in two elections. The employees in those
elections were divided randomly into two groups. Employees in the control
group were interviewed only after the election, while those in the regular
sample were interviewed according to the normal 2-wave procedure. There
were no significant differences in campaign familiarity or vote between the
two groups. The evidence thus suggests that the wave I interviews neither
increased employees' sensitivity to the preelection campaign nor affected
their vote.
23. An (x) indicates that at this point the interviewer asked the employee either to explain the
previous response or to state what else was in the letter.
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II. THiE ASSUMPTION THAT EMPLOYES' PRECAMPAIGN VOTING
PREDISPOSITIONS ARE TENUOUS
If the Board is correct in assuming that employees' precampaign voting
predispositions are tenuous and easily changed by the campaign, then it
would follow that neither intent nor attitudes formed prior to the campaign
would be highly related to vote. On the other hand, if campaigning does not
influence employees to vote contrary to their predispositions, then precam-
paign attitudes and intent should predict vote. To test these contrary hy-
potheses, we measured attitudes and intent in the wave I interview prior
to the campaign and then compared these data with the individual em-
ployee's actual voting pattern.
A. Predicting Vote from Attitudes
To determine the extent to which attitudes predict vote, we asked
questions during the precampaign wave I interviews designed to measure
employees' attitudes toward working conditions (job satisfaction) and
toward unions. Employees' responses were indexed and then compared
with their actual vote following the campaign.
I. Attitudes toward working conditions.
Job satisfaction questions focused on the working conditions most likely
to be affected by unionization. Items that correlated" highly with vote in
the pretest studies" were used. Eight questions concerning working con-
ditions were asked in the preelection interview, seven of which dealt with
specific conditions. 6 Items were scored on a 3-point, equal-interval scale:
"satisfied," "don't know" or "uncertain," and "dissatisfied. '""T An em-
ployee's responses to the eight items were summed to form an index rang-
ing from 24 to 8 to measure his satisfaction with working conditions. 8
The reliability 9 of the index (r -- .78) indicates that the items tested mea-
24. A correlation is a statistical measure of the degree of association between two variables
(here, between attitudes and actual vote of a sample of employees). It ranges from i (indicating a
perfect positive correspondence) through o (indicating no correspondence) to -z (indicating a
perfect negative or inverse relationship, meaning that high scores on one variable correspond to low
scores on the other).
25. See note 15 supra.
26. See note 21 supra.
27. Fewer than z% of the sample failed to answer any single job satisfaction question. No
pattern of refusals emerged, and no employee failed to answer more than two of the eight questions.
Missing responses were scored as "uncertain" or "don't know" so that attitude indexes could be con-
structed for all employees who participated in both interviews. This is a customary method of treating
random missing data, since it is nonbiasing.
28. Individual items were scored 3 (satisfied), 2 (uncertain), or x (dissatisfied). Since there
were eight individual items, an employee's overall job satisfaction index could have ranged from 24
to 8 (the higher the index, the greater the job satisfaction).
29. As used here, "reliability" indicates the degree to which the questions measure a single psy-
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sure a common psychological concept-satisfaction with working condi-
tions. This degree of internal consistency among the items justified using
them together as an index.
Our data revealed a significant"0 correlation between satisfaction with
working conditions and vote (r = -. 53). Those employees who were sat-
isfied with working conditions were most likely to vote against union rep-
resentation; those dissatisfied with working conditions tended to support
the union.
Figure i shows the proportion of the sample voting pro-union at each
FIGURE 1
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN JOB SATISFACTION AND VOTE
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chological concept (e.g., satisfaction with working conditions). There are several methods of esti-
mating reliability. The one used here was based on a maximum likelihood estimate of unidimensional
common variance among items.
30. "Significance" indicates the likelihood that the result found by analyzing the sample data
represents a nonrandom relationship in the population. We use the .oi level of significance at all
times. By stating that the correlation between satisfaction and vote (r =- -. 53) is significant at the
.o level, we can be 99% confident that the actual relationship in the population is not zero. With
a very large sample such as the one in this study, even low correlations will be significantly different
from zero.
A more meaningful question is the power of the relationship. The power of a correlation is its
square, which indicates the proportion of the variance of one variable that can be accounted for by
,the other. A correlation of .io is significant at the .oi level if the sample is greater than i,ooo, but it
may not be very meaningful because it shows that the two variables have only x% of their variance
in common.
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level of satisfaction. Employees with a satisfaction score below i8 voted
3 to i (303 to 99) for union representation; those who scored i8 or above
voted 3 to 1 (453 to i49) against union representation. Knowing whether
an employee's satisfaction score is greater or less than 18 thus enables one
to predict his final vote with 75 percent accuracy.
2. Attitudes toward unions.
Since we did not assume that employees had any first-hand experience
with any union,8 much less with the one that was a party to the election,
the union attitude questions"2 focused on employees' feelings about unions
in general and not on the specific union involved in the election. Inter-
viewers were instructed to assure employees that their responses did not
have to be based on personal experience.
Union attitudes were measured on a 3-point scale of "agree," "don't
know" or "uncertain," and "disagree." The item analysis of the pretest
data33 indicated that employees who answered "uncertain" or "don't know"
to questions about unions were more likely to vote against the union than
for it. On the basis of these pretest results, we scored "uncertain" or "don't
know" responses as slightly unfavorable instead of neutral."
The union attitude indexes, like the job satisfaction indexes, were highly
reliable (r = .8i). Employee responses to the union attitude items were, for
the most part, internally consistent, indicating that combining the items to
form an index was justified.
The correlation between union attitudes and vote was .62. Favorable
attitudes toward unions in general create strong predispositions to vote for
union representation. Figure 2 shows that the percentage of employees
voting for union representation increases at each level of greater favorability
toward unions. Union attitude indexes ranged from a low score of 8 to a
high score of 32." The average pro-union voter's score was 26; the average
pro-company voter's score was 15. Figure 2 shows that employees who had
a union attitude index of 22 or higher favored union representation by
approximately 3 to 1 (381 to 138); those with an index below 22 opposed
union representation by more than 5 to I (414 to 7). Thus, knowing
whether an employee's union attitude score is greater or less than 22 enables
one to predict his vote with 79 percent accuracy.
3. Actually, 43% of the study's respondents had previously been union members elsewhere
and 30% had voted in previous NLRB elections.
32. See note 22 supra.
33. See note 15 supra.
34. To reflect these weights, we scored responses favorable to the unions as 4, uncertain re-
sponses as 2, and unfavorable responses as i. Thus, the index scores ranged from 32 to 8.
35. See note 34 $upra.
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FIGURE 2
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN ATTITUDES TOWARD UNIONS AND VOTE
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3. Combined attitude indexes.
Whether or not an employee favors union representation in dealing
with his employer is likely to be a function of his views as to the desirability
of union representation in general and of his satisfaction with his current
working conditions. The union attitude and job satisfaction indexes were
designed to measure the contribution of each type of predisposition to the
vote decision.
In order to utilize both measures of predispositions, the union attitude
and job satisfaction indexes were combined in a multiple linear regression
equation. " Table i demonstrates that the cross-validated correlation pre-
dicting vote from the two attitude indexes was .67Y" Employee attitudes,
36. Multiple regression is a procedure for determining the maximum linear relationship be-
tween a criterion (here, vote) and a combination of predictors (here, job satisfaction and union atti-
tudes). See M. TATSUOKA, VALIDATION STUDIES, SELECTED Topics IN ADvANCED STATISTICS No. 5
(1969).
37. Because a multiple correlation is based on the particular characteristics of a sample, it is an
overestimate of the relationship between predictor and criterion variables in the population from
which the sample is drawn. In order to estimate the relationship in the relevant populations (voters
in these 31 elections and voters in union representation elections generally), the following standard
procedure was used. The sample within each election was randomly split into two groups. The intra-
election groups were used to form two across-election subsamples. As shown in Table x, each group
was analyzed separately. The predictor weights from each subsample were then applied to the other
to determine the cross-validated multiple correlation.
NLRB CAMPAIGN REGULATION
TABLE 1
MULTIPLE LINEA REGRESSION or ATTrTuDES TO PREDICT VOTE
IN Two SAMPLES
Sample 1 Sample 2
N=501 N = 503
Standardized Beta Weights
Union Attitudes .46 A9
Job Attitudes -. 34 -. 23
Multiple Correlation .70* .64*
Cross-validated Correlation .67* .67*
p--.01.
measured prior to intense preelection campaigning, thus form strong and
stable predispositions to vote for or against union representation.
As shown in Table 2, the attitudes of 83 percent of the pro-company
voters and 78 percent of the pro-union voters correctly predicted their
individual votes.3" Overall, we could correctly predict 81 percent of the
employees' votes from their precampaign attitudes.!'
B. Predicting Vote from Precampaign Intent
In the wave I interviews, employees were asked whether they intended
to vote for or against union representation. Intent was the single best pre-
TABLE 2
COMPARISON OF PREDICTED VOTES (BASED ON PRECAMPAIGN ATTITUDES)
WrnH ACTUAL VOTES
Predicted Vote
Actual Vote Company Union Total
Pro-company 460 92 552
row % 83% 17%
Pro-union 100 352 452
row 22% 78%
Total 560 444 1004
row % 56% 44%
38. The regression equation was used to predict how each individual employee would vote.
The prediction was based on a Bayesian estimate of the likelihood that each employee was a pro-union
or pro-company voter in view of his attitudes, the average pro-union and pro-company voter's atti-
tudes and the actual proportion of pro-union and pro-company voters in the sample. See W. COOLEY
& P. LoIN-s, MuLTIVARUATh PRocanuas FOR rE BmWvioRAL SCENCES 134-41 (1962). A 50% like-
lihood of voting for or against the union was used as the criterion for classifying employees as poten-
tial pro-union or pro-company voters.
39. Attitudinal data collected prior to the 1956 presidential election correctly predicted the
vote of 86% of the electorate. A CamPBELL, P. CoNvEmE, W. MItLER & D. SToKEs, supra note :7,
at 72-75.
January 1976 ]
STANFORD LAW REVIEW
TABLE 3
COMPARISON oF VOTING INTENT PRIOR TO THE CAMPAIGN AND ACTUAL VOTE
Intent to Intent to Refused
Vote for Vote for to
Vote Company Undecided Union Respond Total
Pro-company 393 43 88 28 552
col % 94% 68% 18% 78% 55%
Pro-union 27 20 397 8 452
col % 6% 32% 82% 22% 45%
Total 420 63 485 36 1004
row% 42% 6% 48% 4%
dictor of vote (r = .73). Table 3 shows that 94 percent of the employees
intending to vote for the company did so, as did 82 percent of those intend-
ing to vote for the union. Of the 905 employees who reported a firm intent
for or against the union, 87 percent voted in accordance with that intent.
By using intent to predict vote, we correctly predicted the outcome of 29
of 3 elections.4"
Intent is highly related to attitudes. The cross-validated multiple corre-
lation between union attitudes, job satisfaction, and intent was .75, as shown
by Table 4. Employees whose job satisfaction was low relative to others
in their unit and who at the same time had favorable attitudes toward
unions usually intended to vote for union representation. Similarly, most
employees who were satisfied with working conditions and generally
unfavorable toward unions at no time intended to vote for union repre-
sentation. The .67 correlation between attitudes and vote4 indicates that
to a large extent employees acted on their attitudes.
The powerful correlation between attitudes and vote, as well as that
between intent and vote, is contrary to the Board's assumption that pre-
campaign intent is tenuous and easily altered by the campaign. The relation-
ship between predispositions and vote is not only powerful, but broadly
general. Attitudes and intent successfully predicted vote in midwestern
farm communities, urban ghettos and rural Kentucky towns; among em-
ployees working in factories, warehouses, retail stores, nursing homes and
offices; and in units ranging from 4 to nearly 400 employees. Attitudes and
intent predicted vote for males and females; for whites, blacks and Spanish-
speaking; for old and young; and for well and poorly educated. They pre-
dicted vote when local unemployment was 2 percent and when it was io
percent. There is no reason to suppose that a similarly powerful relation-
4o. Attitudes also predicted the outcome of all but two elections. However, the elections which
intent failed to predict were different from the elections attitudes failed to predict.
41. See Table z supra.
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TABLE 4
MULTIPLE Cou.REATioN BETwE.N ATTiTUDEs AND INTENT
Sample 1 Sample 2
N=488 N=480
Standardized Beta Weights
Union Attitudes 53 .54
Job Attitudes -33 -31
Multiple Correlation .76* .75*
Cross-validated Correlation .76* .75*
ship between predispositions and vote would not exist in other union rep-
resentations elections. Admittedly, the relationship has not been established
empirically outside the Midwest and upper South. The diversity of the situ-
ations in which predispositions do predict vote, however, suggests that the
relationship would be nullified only in truly extraordinary circumstances.
C. Accounting for Other Factors
It is possible that employee predispositions to vote for or against union
representation were stimulated, fixed or changed by campaigning that
occurred prior to the wave I interview.' In order to test this hypothesis,
we divided the elections into two groups: those in which neither party
conducted a substantial campaign ' prior to wave I interviews and those
in which one or both did so. Table 5 shows that preinterview campaigning
did not affect the relationship between predispositions and vote. Voting
was as predictable when there had been no substantial campaigning prior
to wave I as when there had been campaigning. Thus, there is no evidence
that pre-wave I campaigning had the effect of fixing attitudes or intent.
Predispositions failed to predict vote accurately for 19 percent of the
employees interviewed. Neither demographic nor job experience charac-
teristics distinguished the "errors" (voting predictions based on attitudes)
42. Extensive union campaigning often occurs during the collection of union authorization
cards before the Board directs an election (and therefore before the wave I interviews in this study).
43. A substantial campaign for purposes of this analysis was defined as one in which at least
one meeting was conducted.
44. This percentage is appropriate for both the attitude- and intent-based predictions. Atti-
tude data were available on all employees, but some employees were undecided at wave I or re-
fused to answer the intent question. Because the two predispositional measures were so highly corre-
lated (r = .75), those employees who were switchers (their intent did not correctly predict their
vote) were also likely to be prediction errors (their attitudes did not correctly predict their vote).
There was no gain in vote predictability by adding intent to attitudes in the multiple regression
equation since most of the switchers were still erroneously classified. Using attitudes alone in the
regression equation resulted in a lower level of prediction, but not all switchers were prediction
errors, so that a somewhat different and larger group of employees, the prediction errors, was
identified.
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TABLE 5
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN PREDISPOSITIONS AND VOTE IN ELECTIONS WITH
SUBSTANTIAL PRE-WAVE I CAMPAIGNING, COMPARED TO ELECTIONS
WITHOUT SUBSTANTIAL CAMPAIGNING
Correlations with Vote
Union Job
Attitude Attitude
Campaign Group' Index Index Intent
No Substantial
Campaigning .64* -. 49* .730
N 137 137 136
Substantial
Campaigning .63* -. 530 .730
N 834 834 802
Test for the Difference Between Correlations
Union Job
Attitude Attitude
Index Index Intent
Zb .25 .58 .05
*p -_E.01.
Six elections had no substantial campaigning prior to the wave I interview. Two elections
could not be classified since we were unable to determine the extent of pre-wave I campaigning.
They were excluded from this analysis.
bZ is the test for the difference between correlations in two independent samples. Z must be
greater than 2.33 to be significant at the .01 level.
or "switchers" (voting predictions based on intent) from those who voted
in accord with their precampaign attitudes or intent. Switchers and errors
who voted pro-company resembled other pro-company voters; those who
voted pro-union resembled other pro-union voters.
III. TmH AsSUMPTION THAT EMPLOYEES ATTEND CLOSELY
TO THE CAMPAIGN
To assess the extent to which employees were attentive to the campaign
(and therefore possibly influenced by it), we measured the employees'famil-
iarity both with the campaign in general and with particular issues during
the postelection wave II interviews. As explained above, we did this by
comparing the issues reported by each employee as having been raised in
the campaign with the actual campaign issues appearing in written mate-
rials, speeches, and personal contacts.4"
45. See text before and after note 23 supra. An employee was credited with recalling any cam-
paign issue mentioned in response to any open-ended question, including those asking his and other
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A. Employees' Familiarity with the Campaign in General
When asked to recall what the employer had said in letters, meetings
or personal contacts, most employees could recall only io percent of the
company campaign issues (CFI = 9.60). When asked the same questions
about the union campaign, employees on the average reported approxi-
mately 7 percent of the issues (UFI - 7.44)." This low level of familiarity
with the campaigns of both parties contradicts the Board's assumption that
employees are attentive to the campaign. Either the employees largely
ignored the campaign or they quickly forgot the issues. In either event,
they cannot be described as having been attentive to the campaign."
B. Employees' Familiarity with Particular Campaign Issues
r. Company campaign issues (CFI).
One might anticipate that even if most employees recalled comparatively
few issues, nearly all employees would recall the issues that were central
to the campaign. This was not the case 8 Table 6 shows that no company
issue was reported by more than 40 percent of the employees in the elections
in which it was raised; only six company issues were reported by 30 percent
or more of the employees. 9
2. Union campaign issues (UFI).
As Table 7 demonstrates, the union's campaign claims that it would
improve wages (issue i) and that it would prevent unfairness (issue 2)
were recalled by many more employees (71 percent and 64 percent respec-
tively) than any company theme. However, the frequency with which these
themes were recalled may have little to do with employees' awareness of
campaign content. Mention of these items may be due to an awareness that
employees' reasons for their vote. It was unnecessary for an employee to report any details of a
campaign issue to be credited with having recalled that issue. See note 23 supra and accompanying
text.
46. For an explanation of how the CFI and UFI indexes were constructed, see id.
47. The low level of campaign familiarity was not due to a substantial time lag between the
end of the campaign and the wave II interview. Eighty-four percent (1o59 out of 1264) of all wave II
interviews took place within 2 days after the election and 92% (1163 out of 1264) within 4 days.
The correlation between the number of days after the election the wave Il interview took place and
CFI was -. 05 and the correlation with UPI was .o2, neither of which is statistically significant.
48. Voters in political elections have been found similarly inattentive to the campaign. Only
16% of the voters in the 1948 Presidential election knew the correct stands of both candidates on
two major issues of the campaign. Over a third knew only one stand correctly or none at all. B. BER.L-
SONz, P. LAzAass'aLD & V. McPHEE, supra note 17, at 227.
49. It should be apparent that the percentage of employees recognizing particular issues as
defined by our code categories depended to some extent on the breadth of the categories. The broader
the categories, the greater the number of employee responses that were likely to be counted within
each one and the higher the campaign familiarity index was likely to be for that issue. In order to
maximize the measurement of employees' familiarity with campaign issues, we chose to make the
categories as broad as the actual campaign messages reasonably permitted. This methodological issue
is treated more fully in our final report soon to be published.
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TABLE 6
REcoGNIToN oF COMPANY CAMPAIGN ISSUES
Percent of
Employees
Number of Reporting
Number of Employees Issue in
Elections in Elections Elections
in Which in Which in Which
Issue Was Issue Was Issue Was
Issue Used Used Used Issue Content
1. 28 1055 40 Improvements not dependent on unionization
2. 7 338 37 New company/management recently taken over
3. 14 590 35 Plant closing/moving may follow unionization
(nonretaliatory)
4. 26 943 33 Financial costs of union dues, etc. outweigh
gains
5. 26 1001 32 Union is outsider. Will interfere with effi-
ciency, harm employer-employee relations.
6. 22 857 30 Loss of benefits may follow unionization
(nonretaliatory)
7. 27 1010 27 Wages good, equal to/better than under union
contracts
8. 9 264 25 Discharges/layoffs may follow unionization
(nonretaliatory)
9. 12 450 20 Pensions/profit-sharing good, equal to/better
than under union contracts
10. 10 470 20 Wages/working conditions will/may improve
11. 23 810 19 If union wins, strike may follow
12. 20 756 19 Employer has treated employees fairly/well/
equally
13. 7 256 19 Company too small to need union
14. 25 995 19 Get facts before deciding. Employer will pro-
vide facts, accept employee decision
15. 7 286 15 Union corruption
16. 15 645 13 Union may fine employees
17. 6 230 12 Named individual has treated employees
fairly/well/equally
18. 5 69 11 Company will fight union as hard as legally
possible
19. 6 263 11 No retaliation if union wins
20. 22 918 10 Strikers will lose wages, lose more than gain
21. 16 604 10 Sick leave/insurance good, equal to/better than
under union contracts
22. 8 302 10 Phase II prevents wage increase greater than
employer would/has raised
23. 12 533 9 Holidays/vacations good, equal to/better than
under union contracts
24. 15 550 8 Miscellaneous specific working conditions good,
equal to/better than under union contracts
25. 22 906 8 Unions not concerned with employee welfare
26: 18 699 8 Employees should be certain to vote
27. 14 503 8 No retaliation against union supporters if union
loses
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TABLE 6-Continued
28. 21 833 7 Strike may lead to loss of jobs
29. 5 178 7 Good points of unionization
30. 6 247 6 This union involved in strikes elsewhere
31. 9 299 5 Union maybe arbitrary/unresponsive
32. 6 225 5 Union can/has/will cause employees to be
discharged
33. 8 322 3 Unions use violence as a tactic
34. 6 273 2 Union has engaged in unlawful conduct
(nonviolent)
35. 11 367 2 Union easy to get in, difficult to get out
unions typically claim the ability to improve wages and ensure fair treat-
ment, themes which correspond to opinions already held by many em-
ployees prior to the campaign. Recall of other themes was substantially
lower, with only one other issue-the union will improve working con-
ditions generally (issue 3)-reported by more than 30 percent of the voters.
In order to test whether important issues are recalled in precise detail,
we asked about union campaign statements concerning wages obtained
elsewhere. Such statements are central to many campaigns and when
deemed significantly inaccurate have been the basis for setting aside elec-
tions. The Board has stated that wages obtained elsewhere are "a subject
of utmost concern to the employees.""°
In 22 of the elections studied, the union campaign included a statement
about wages it had obtained elsewhere' Employees in each of those elec-
tions were asked if the union had made such a statement. Only 50 percent
(367 out of 733) were aware that it had. Only 22 percent were able to recall
the amount of the claim within io percent5 2 Moreover, precision of recall
was unrelated to vote. There were no more union voters among those who
recalled the union's wage claims within io percent than among those whose
recall was not within io percent or those who remembered that the union
had made wage claims, but had no recollection of the amount of the claim.
C. The Campaign's Effect on Switchers and Undecided Voters
While the great majority of the employees voted in accord with their
precampaign intent, approximately 13 percent voted contrary to their ori-
50. See, e.g., Western Health Facilities, Inc., 2o8 N.L.R.B. 56 (1974). The courts also regard
assertions about wages as crucial to the voting decision. See, e.g., notes 8 & 9 supra.
51. None of these statements was challenged before the Board as being inaccurate; nor did we
have access to data that would determine their accuracy.
52. Any employee response arguably accurate within io% was so categorized. In two elections,
for example, the union published salary ranges for a number of different job classifications; a re-
sponse within io% of any range was coded as accurate.
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TABLE 7
RECOGNITION OF UNION CAnAIGN ISSUES
Percent of
Employees
Number of Reporting
Number of Employees Issue in
Elections in Elections Elections
in Which in Which in Which
Issue Was Issue Was Issue Was
Issue Used Used Used Issue Content
1. 26 865 71 Wages unsatisfactory; union will improve
2. 27 976 64 Union will prevent unfairness, set up grievance
procedure/seniority system
3. 17 583 36 Working conditions in general unsatisfactory;
union will improve
4. 21 772 28 Sick leave/insurance unsatisfactory; union will
improve
5. 23 848 26 Union has obtained gains elsewhere
6. 20 578 23 Holidays/vacations unsatisfactory; union will
improve
7. 20 693 19 Pensions unsatisfactory; union will improve
8. 26 910 17 Union strength will provide employees with
voice in wages, working conditions
9. 7 378 11 Safety conditions unsatisfactory; union will
improve
10. 24 910 10 Union not outsider, bargains for what employees
want
11. 6 213 10 Personal criticism of employer
12. 20 752 7 Employer promises/good treatment may not
continue without union
13. 18 696 6 Employees choose union leaders
14. 12 488 6 Employer tried to deceive employees
15. 18 677 6 Employer will seek to persuade/frighten
employees to vote against union
16. 5 239 6 Production requirements unsatisfactory; union
will improve
17. 21 744 5 Dues/initiation fees reasonable
18. 9 395 5 Union will require job classification
19. 14 485 4 Company fears union strength
20. 17 635 3 Employees have legal right to engage in union
activity
21. 12 449 3 Strikes are not called unnecessarily
22. 12 342 3 No initiation fees for present employees
23. 6 234 2 This is appropriate union for this company/
industry
24. 11 436 2 Union does not fine/assess members
25. 13 443 1 No dues until contract signed/ratified
26. 18 763 1 No strike without vote
27. 6 245 1 Employer unconcerned with employee welfare
28. 5 228 0 Authorization cards confidential
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TABLE 8
CAMPAIGN FAMLIARUTY OF EMPLOYEES WHO VOTED As THEY INTENDED
CO'PARED TO THOSE WHO SWITCHED
Pro-union Intent; Pro-union Intent;
Pro-company Vote Pro-union Vote
Average Average
Familiarity N Familiarity N r p
Company
Campaign 11.02* 87 10.43* 389 -. 02 NS
Pro-company Intent; Pro-company Intent;
Pro-union Vote Pro-company Vote
Average Average
Familiarity N Familiarity N r p
Union
Campaign 11.06* 25 4.55* 346 .19 .01
These figures represent the average percent of campaign issues recalled by the employees in
the sample as recorded in their UFI and CFI.
ginal intent and 6 percent were undecided about which way to vote at
wave L" These two groups were few in number, both within and across
all elections, but their votes were sufficiently numerous to determine the
outcome of nine elections. If these employees were highly attentive to the
campaign of the party for which they ultimately voted, this fact would be
some indication that they relied on that campaign in reaching their vote
decision.
i. The findings.
Table 8 shows that employees who switched from a company intent
to a union vote did report significantly more about the union campaign
than employees whose company intent remained firm through vote (r -
.J9). Those who switched from a union intent to a company vote were not,
however, significantly more familiar with the company campaign than
those whose union intent held firm (r = -. 02). There was thus no evi-
dence that familiarity with the content of the company campaign was
associated with switching to the company.
Those employees who were undecided about which way to vote at
wave I followed the same pattern as the switchers. Although Table 9 shows
that the undecided who voted pro-union were significantly more familiar
with the union campaign than those who voted pro-company (r = -34),
53. See Table 3 supra.
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TABLE 9
1 CAMPAIGN FAMILIARITY OF UNDECIDED EMPLOYEES WHO VOTED
PRO-UNION COMPARED TO THOSE WHO VOTED PRO-COMPANY
Undecided Intent; Undecided Intent;
Pro-companyVote Pro-union Vote
Average Average
Familiarity N Familiarity N r p
Company
Campaign 7.51* 42 7.13* 20 -. 02 NS
Union
Campaign 3.74* 38 9.79* 18 .34 .01
* These figures represent the average percent of campaign issues recalled by the employees in
the sample as recorded in their UFI and CFL
those who voted pro-company were no more familiar with the company
campaign than those who voted pro-union (r = -. m)."
Even if familiarity with the union's campaign influences some em-
ployees who are initially undecided or intend to vote company to switch
(and indeed switch may precede exposure and familiarity), the influence
is not strong. Neither the undecided nor the switchers were very familiar
with the campaign of either party. Those who voted pro-union were no
more familiar with the union campaign than those who intended to vote
pro-union and did; those who voted pro-company were no more familiar
with the company campaign than those who intended to vote pro-com-
pany and did." Furthermore, a substantial majority of both switchers
(76 percent) and undecided (68 percent) voted company." Since there
were so few switchers and undecided, this means that less than 5 percent
of the total sample either switched to the union or were originally undecided
and ultimately voted pro-union. The content of the union campaign may
be influencing some employees, but not enough to make a difference in
many elections."
IV. CONCLUSION
Board decisions setting aside elections because the winning party has
engaged in a misrepresentation of fact or law are based on the assumption
54. The apparent reason why the switchers and the undecided who vote pro-union know sig-
nificantly more about the union campaign than those who vote consistent with their pro-company
intent is that the former attend union meetings more frequently.
55. These data are entirely consistent with the political voter studies that show the switchers
and the undecided to be less attentive to political communications than those voters who make early
and firm vote decisions. See, e.g., P. LAZAISFELD, B. BERELsoN & H. GAUDET, supra note 17, at 56, 59.
See also Part I, supra note io, at 1486-87.
56. See Table 3 supra.
57. All analyses described in this section were performed also on those employees who voted
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that employees attend closely to the campaign and that their vote is likely
to be influenced by campaign assertions. The data, however, indicate that
employees are not generally attentive to the campaign. Even union claims
as to wages obtained elsewhere are remembered with reasonable accuracy
by fewer than 25 percent of the employees. More importantly, there is little
evidence that the precise details of campaign propaganda play a substantial
role in influencing vote. Slightly more than 8o percent of the sample voted
as they had planned prior to the campaign.58 Even those who switched
displayed little familiarity with the campaign of the party for which they
ultimately voted. Switching to the union was related to familiarity with the
union campaign, but such switching occurs so rarely that it is hardly ever
likely to affect the election outcome.
It makes little sense for the Board to set aside election results in many
cases in the hope of protecting free choice in a few. The likelihood that
campaign misrepresentations will affect outcome is so slim that continued
application of the Hollywood Ceramics doctrine is more likely to frustrate
free choice than to protect it.
The Board has no means by which to identify those few cases in which
a campaign misrepresentation might affect outcome. It could hardly assess
the impact of misrepresentations in individual cases by questioning em-
ployees as to how they voted and why. An employee's assertion that he voted
in favor of union representation because of a campaign misrepresentation
would be highly suspect. Unless the Board knew that the employee was
undecided or planned to vote against the union prior to the time the mis-
representation was made, it could not possibly conclude that misrepresen-
tation caused him to vote pro-union. However, questioning by government
agents before and after each election as to how employees planned to vote,
did vote and why would be both impracticable and inconsistent with the
statutory requirement of a secret ballot.
The possibility that continued regulation may in some cases prevent
employees from being influenced by a misrepresentation must also be
weighed against the costs of regulation. The fact that misleading or de-
ceptive statements might constitute grounds for setting aside an election
provides a tempting basis upon which the losing side may file objections,
thus contributing to the Board's already staggering caseload." This, in
differently than their attitudes or card-signing behavior predicted. In no case were the results different
from those found for the undecided and the switchers.
58. The stability of employees' attitudes and intent as predictors of vote has implications beyond
the Hollywood Ceramics doctrine and the assumptions on which it is based. See notes 13 & 14
supra. For example, these findings are inconsistent with the assumption that employees are unsophisti-
cated about labor relations and therefore easily swayed by campaign assertions. See Part I, supra note
io, at 1473-75.
59. In fiscal year 1974, the NLRB received a record number of 42,373 cases, exceeding the
January 1976]
284 STANFORD LAW REVIEW [Vol. 28: Page 263
turn, has been said to lower the quality of the Board's decisions and impair
its ability to enforce the Act."' The delay involved in resolving objections
also frustrates the statutory policy of promptly determining whether or not
employees wish union representation.
Accordingly, we recommend that the Board overrule Hollywood Ce-
ramics and refuse in the future to set aside elections in which the winner
is alleged to have engaged in a misrepresentation of fact or law.
41,077 cases received in fiscal 1973, the previous high point. 39 NLRB ANt. REP. 1 (1974). Objec-
tions were filed in x,iii of 9,I2 elections. Id. at 2I8-I9.
6o. See Bok, supra note 3, at 6o-6i; Sarnofi, supra note 3, at 278-79; R. Wn.ums, P. JtAus &
K. HuHm, supra note 9, at 438.
